January, 194o

JURY DEMANDS IN THE NEW FEDERAL PROCEDURE
0.

L. MCCASKILL t

When Congress empowered the Supreme Court to unite the general rules prescribed by it for cases in equity with those in actions at
law, so as to secure one form of civil action for both,' it had misgivings
as to what might happen to jury trials. The Act contains a warning
that in any such union jury trial as at common law and as declared by
the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution must be preserved inviolate. As a further safeguard it provides that any such rules promulgated become effective only after the close of the following Congress,
thus giving it an opportunity to disapprove the scheme adopted, or any
of its parts, if they seemed to endanger the right. The desire of Congress to sit in judgment on laws of the Supreme Court either lost its
thrill of novelty, or it decided to affirm the decision of the Court by inaction. Although Rule 2 2 promulgated by the Court establishes the one
form of action, Rule 38 3 declares in no uncertain language that both
Constitutional and statutory jury trial shall be preserved inviolate, and
sets out a method of obtaining it by written demand. Since all other
Rules must be interpreted in the light of this one, the question whether
jury trial is preserved in the new federal procedure might seem to be
a closed one. Arriving at a destination, however, often involves something more than an enthusiastic and purposeful start. The fears
t Ph. B., igoi, J. D., 1905, University of Chicago; Professor of Law, University
of Illinois; member of the drafting committee of Illinois Civil Practice Act of 1933;
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I. 48 STAT. 1064 (1934), 28 U. S. C. A. § 723c fSupp. 1938).
2. FED. RULES Civ. PRoC. (1934) rule 2 reads: ' One Form of Action. There shall
be one form of action to be known as 'civil action'."
3. Id., rule 38 reads:
"Jury Trial of Right.
"(a) Right Preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States shall be
preserved to the parties inviolate.
"(b) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right
by a jury by serving upon the other parties a demand therefor in writing at any time
after the commencement of the action and not later than lO days after the service of the
last pleading directed to such issue. Such demand may be indorsed upon a pleading of
the party.
"(c) Same: Specification of Issues. In his demand a party may specify the issues
which he wishes so tried; otherwise he shall be deemed to have demanded trial by jury
for all the issues so triable. If he has demanded trial by jury for only some of the
issues, any other party within 1o days after service of the demand or such lesser time

as the court.may order, may serve a demand for trial by jury of any other or all of the
issues of fact in the action.
"(d) Waiver. The failure of a party to serve a demand as required by this rule
and to file it as required by Rule 5 (d)constitutes a waiver by him of trial by jury. A
demand for trial by jury made as herein provided may not be withdrawn without the
consent of the parties."

(31s)
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expressed by Congress were based upon a past experience of various
States under a single form of action, and had something more than a
shadowy basis. The one form of action is but a vehicle for enforcing
rights, and is no stronger than its weakest vital part. Though it has
been experimented with in various forms for nearly ninety years, there
is still much dispute as to what it really is. If there are weak places in
the structure created by the Supreme Court's advisory committee, which
the Court itself has not yet detected, they should be known so that they
may be guarded against. Though Congress may have done so, it is
folly to trust solely upon declared intentions of the builders.
It is the purpose of this paper to point out some weak spots in the
federal scheme which endanger the right intended to be protected, but
which may be strengthened if care is exercised in interpretation. It is
hoped that the criticisms offered will be considered as constructive.
Although many things in this paper have been discussed by this writer
before, even in their relation to Federal Rules creating one form of
action, because the discussion preceded the rules it could not bear
directly upon their language and its interpretation. The earlier treatment was preventive in character. 4 The present treatment is intended
to be curative. The patient must not die even though there be considerable similarity in the treatments. The discussion centers around
the inter-relations of Rules 2, io 5 and 38, and the dangers, because of
obscurity and the laudable desire to simplify pleadings, either of unduly
4. McCasldll, One Form of Civil Action, But What Procedure, for the Federal
Courts ('935) 30 ILL. L. Rxv. 415.
5. FED. RULES Civ. PRoc. (934)

rule io reads:
"Form of Pleadings.
"(a) Caption; Names of Parties. Every pleading shall contain a caption setting
forth the name of the court, the title of the action, the file number, and a designation as
in Rule 7 (a). In the complaint the title of the action shall include the names of all the
parties, but in other pleadings it is sufficient to state the name of the first party on each
side with an appropriate indication of other parties.
"(b) Paragraphs; Separate Statements. All averments of claim or defense shall
be made in numbered paragraphs, the contents of each of which shall be limited as far
as practicable to a statement of a single set of circumstances; and a paragraph may be
referred to by number in all succeeding pleadings. Each claim founded upon a separate
transaction or occurrence and each defense other than denials shall be stated in a separate count or defense whenever a separation facilitates the clear presentation of the matters set forth.
"(c) Adoption by Reference; Exhibits. Statements in a pleading may be adopted
by reference in a different part of the same pleading or in another pleading or in any
motion. A copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part
thereof for all purposes."
Rule 8 (a), which should be construed in connection with Rule io, reads:
"General Rules of Pleading.
"(a) Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whethei
an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall contain 0i) a
short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends,
unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction to support it, (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he
deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be
demanded."
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urtailing jury trial, or, in an effort to avoid that evil, of unduly
extending it.
The second paragraph of Rule 38 states that a party may demand
a trial by jury "of any issue triable of right by a jury" by serving a
demand therefor in writing at any time after the commencement of
the action, and not later than IO days after the serivce of the last pleading directed to such issue. The next paragraph provides that a party
in his demand may specify the issues " he wishes so tried", and that in
default of specification he shall be deemed to have demanded jury trial
for "all the issues so triable". The Rule does not purport to state what
issues are properly triable to a jury. It is assumed that this is known.
A party knowing the extent of his right is given the privilege of claiming the whole or any part of it. A party who does not know whether
he has a right, or who is uncertain of its extent, is permitted to experiment, demanding what he wishes. Presumably what he will get will be
measured by what he should have, if the trial court can determine it
any better than he can, unless what he may have is more than what he
has wished for, in which event the wish governs. If he does not want
to run the risk of asking for too little, and this seems to be characteristic
of careful practitioners, he may gamble on the court's knowledge. If
the court is in doubt, and wishes to play safe, he may get more than he
is entitled to.
The writer would not have the temerity to make the above analysis
of the rule upon jury demands, showing its vagueness, if the federal
system were still one in which law actions and equity suits were separately administered, for, under that system, the bench and bar have no
particular difficulty in determining the extent of rights to jury trial.
The difficulties arise only because in the new system they may be administered together, and border lines which were once clear and distinct
may be difficult of ascertainment. The greater the effort in the new
system to obliterate the boundaries in the interest of simplifying pleadings, avoiding variances and new trials, and giving the relief the proof
shows a party is entitled to, the more difficult it becomes to reconstruct
the boundaries for the purpose of determining the right of jury trial
and its extent. If Rule io (b) sanctions the pleading of a lay transaction in a single count, without reference to the types of reliefs obtainable thereon, legal or equitable or both, and if Rule 2, creating the one
form of action, necessarily involves the concept of "merging" 6 legal
6. For suggestions that the union of legal and equitable claims under one form of
action involves a merger of them, see CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 46, 77-84; 1
MooRE, FEDEmAL PRACTICE (1938) i05, III, 117-143, 146, 447, 449; 3 id. at 309; PIKE,
CASES ON NEaW FEDERAL AND CODE PROCEDURE (1939) 79-103; Clark and Moore, A
New Federal Procedure (1935) 44 YALE L. J.415, 1293.
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and equitable remedies, as distinguished from a less intimate joinder,
the task of the trial judge in determining to what issues he should
apply a jury demand has become greatly complicated. The law of compensation is at work. Simplicity of procedure in one respect can be had
only at the cost of complexity in another. It is, therefore, because of
the possible implications in Rules 2 and io, singly and together, that
the foregoing analysis of the jury demand is made. The trial judge
and the practitioner may welcome some suggestions which would otherwise seem impertinent. Until the Supreme Court speaks in more
definite language than is used in the Rules some guidance will be necessary. Notes of the advisory committee which framed the Rules will,
of course, be consulted, as will expositions by the able assistants who
sat in on their deliberations, but it will be remembered that these are
persuasive only, and that they have not as yet received authoritative
sanction.
It has been suggested by able writers, both before and since the
promulgation of the Rules, that the right of trial by jury is attached
to issues of fact, not to suits of a certain character, and that an eradication of distinctions between the character of suits as legal or equitable
has no effect in determining whether the issues should be tried with or
without jury.7 If this could be demonstrated, the problem of applying
the jury demand under Rule 38 would be very simple. It is because it
cannot be demonstrated, because it is false, that the difficulty exists.
The right of jury trial under the Seventh Amendment attached to issues
found in law actions only, never to issues in an equity suit, and it is
not true that the issues in a law action were never the same as in an
equity suit. On the contrary, almost any issue found in a law action
may also be found in an equity suit. Issues bearing upon title to land
may be found in an action of ejectment, but they are also found in bills
quia timet, in injunction suits, and many other strictly equitable proceedings." At one time if an issue of title arose in an equity suit, a
feigned issue was made up and sent to a law court to try and report
back to the equity court,' but even then the finding of the law court
At times the users of the terms "coalesce", "amalgamate" and "merge" seem to
mean nothing more than the bringing together of legal and equitable remedies in the
same suit. Studied use of these terms, and avoidance of the terms "union"' and "joinder", however, indicate that there is some meaning they wish to convey not embodied
in the latter terms. This more clearly appears when they discuss pleadings, which,
they claim, have no relation to jury trial or to jury demands. It also appears when they
discuss the one form of action apart from jury trials.
7. CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 53-55; I MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTICE (1938) ii0,
44; Clark and Moore, supra note 6, at 1293-1294.
8. See Ward v. Farwell, 97 Ill. 593, 612 (i88); Northwestern Univ. v. Wesley
Mem. Hospital, 290 Ill. 205, 213, 125 N. E. i3, 17 (r919); Lynch v. Metropolitan El.
Ry.,
129
N. Y. 274, 278-279, 29 N. E. 315 (i891) ; City of Syracuse v. Hogan, 234 N. Y.
457, 464, 38 N. E.4 409 (1923) (dissenting opinion of Cardozo, J.).
9. See Johnson v. Harmon, 94 U. S. 371, 372 (1876).
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upon the issues was advisory only. In modern times equity courts try
these issues themselves, calling in juries to aid them or not as they see
fit. Issues of possession, of money due on promises, of damages to
property, even of negligence resulting in personal injury, 10 are found
in equity suits as well as in law actions. Issues are colorless apart
from the proceedings in which they are found. Their character, as
triable with or without jury, depends upon association with other issues
and remedies sought upon their determination. Issues, like men, have
a nationality of origin or of adoption. They do not drift around in
space, sole masters of their own destiny.
It requires no particular discrimination to identify jury issues in
a territory where there are no other kinds of issues. Difficulties arise
with the disappearance of territorial boundaries. Issues will now be
found in mixed crowds. The greater their similarity of dress, language and gdose step, the more difficult it will be to determine from
whence they came. The federal judge of the divided administration,
with the easy task of identifying jury from non-jury issues, must carry
on under the one form of action. It does not add to the clarity of his
thinking to admonish him that law and equity are now one, that they
are "merged", "amalgamated", or "coalesced", that claims may now
be set forth apart from characterizing remedies, but that he must be
most zealous in protecting the right of jury trial. He may wonder if
he is being blindfolded and asked to pin a tail on the donkey.1 1 If he
may think of the one form of action as a joinder of legal and equitable
remedies less intimate than a merger, analogous to a marriage with
sex remaining the same, eliminating the necessity of dealing with
neuters, and if he can reasonably interpret Rule io as sanctioning only
such a grouping together of facts as bear upon a particular remedy, he
may be able to give effectiveness to the jury demand of Rule 38.
This is not the place to discuss the merits of jury trial. For the
purposes of this discussion it may be admitted to be a cumbersome and
complicating part of judicial machinery, very much overrated as to its
protective qualities. It is enough for us to know that the necessity for
its retention is contained in the fundamental law until such time as it
is amended. If it is not desired it may be waived. The burden may
be placed upon him who wants it to make that want known, and to make
it known at any reasonable time before trial. But neither conscious
io. See Nashville Ry. & Lt. Co. v. Bunn, 168 Fed. 862, 863 (C. C. A. 6th, i909);
First Tr. & Say. Bk. v. Lowry, I5I Ill. App. 170, 173 (1909).

ii. The fallacy of disassociating facts in pleadings from their characterizing remedies in a system which sanctions preliminary moves in preparation for the trial is
developed at greater length in McCaskill, supra note 4, at 415. Pleading colorless facts
belongs to the system known as Notice Pleading, which does not adapt itself to a system where legal and equitable remedies are joined. See note 26 infra.
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nor unconscious devices should be employed to entrap him into waivers
not intended, which reveal to him the true character of the issues too
late for him to make an effective demand. Nor should he be forced
to submit to a trial by jury of issues not required to be so tried by the
fundamental law, and which can be better tried by a trained jurist.
Smoke screens which hide the character of issues, though they be desirable for other purposes, are not within the spirit of devices permitted
by the Constitution.
Lest it be thought that the writer is conjuring up imaginary difficulties which never materialize, let him again call attention to some
comparatively common problems which taxed the ingenuity and skill
of as eminent a jurist as the late Justice Cardozo while he was a member
of the New York Court of Appeals. In two of the opinions here
referred to, he wrote for the court. In the third case he was moved to
write a dissent. All were problems under the one forni of action in
New York, and involved jury trial.
In the first of the cases 12 a sub-contractor brought a suit against
the contractor and owner to enforce a mechanic's lien for labor and
materials, claiming a balance due. The owner denied the lien. The
contractor traversed the complaint, and counterclaimed for damages
against the sub-contractor for wrongfully abandoning his contract. A
reply denied the counterclaim. Upon these issues plaintiff moved that
the issues be stated for a jury trial, and two issues were stated: (I)
Is the plaintiff entitled to a money judgment against the contractor,
and, if so, for how much? (2) Is the contractor entitled to a money
judgment against the plaintiff, and, if so, for how much? A jury
found in response to the questions that plaintiff was entitled to a money
judgment against the contractor in a stated amount, and that the contractor was not entitled to recover anything from plaintiff. The contractor requested that the verdicts be treated as advisory, and that the
court find the issues for itself. This the court declined to do, holding
that both verdicts were binding as common law verdicts. Justice
Cardozo, writing for the court, held that the verdicts were advisory as
to plaintiff, because he had waived his right to jury trial by joining legal
with equitable issues in the same suit, but that they were binding upon
defendant contractor. His claim was an independent cause of action,
triable by jury as of right. The verdicts were conclusive that plaintiff
had not abandoned the contract, and that plaintiff was entitled
to a money judgment against the contractor. But defendant
had joined a legal claim in plaintiff's suit for an equitable one, and
no answer was given to the question why, if the character of the
12. Di Menna v. Cooper & Evans Co., 22o N. Y. 391, 115

N. E. 993 (1917).
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issues was to be determined by waiver, he did not also waive jury trial.
The trial court had relieved plaintiff from his waiver, if there was one.
Furthermore, the issues under the complaint and counterclaim, so far
as they invloved the contractor, were identical. The case is noted for
its holding that a legal counterclaim does not merge with an equitable
complaint in the same suit.
Eight years later, without distinguishing the above case, Justice
Cardozo, again writing for the court, held 13 that an equitable counterclaim to a suit for damages for breach of contract so nearly presented
the same issues as were presented in the answer, though it sought reformation of the contract, that it became merged into the character of the
suit brought, requiring all issues, even those of mutual mistake and
fraud, to be tried by a jury. It also required that the parol evidence
rule be disregarded.
Two years earlier, the City of Syracuse sought to recover possession of a portion of a public street which it was claimed defendant had
appropriated with his store building, and to require defendant at his
own expense to remove the building. 14 The allegations were sufficient
to show that a sheriff could not well put the city in possession. The
majority of the Court of Appeals said that this was an action of ejectment, with injunctive relief incidental, or merged into it, and that all the
issues were triable by jury. Justice Cardozo, in dissenting, contended
that the merger was the other way, and that none of the issues were
triable by jury. He denied that title must first be determined at law,
saying: "We have left far in the distance the wasteful duplication of
remedies and trials. We shall set the clock back many years if we return to it today". Neither majority nor minority referred to the form
of the complaint as having any bearing.
These opinions are called to attention for the purpose of demonstrating that even the ablest judicial minds cannot avoid circuity when
they look upon the one form of action as a "merger" of legal and equitable remedies. At one time the equitable issues submerge the legal, at
another the legal issues submerge the equitable. At still another time
they half merge and half persist with separate characteristics. If there
are mergers, it is difficult to tell how they work, and the limitations of
their operation. Similar instances without number from almost any
jurisdiction having the one form of action can be cited. The confusion
exists when there is an attempt to follow the "merger" view of the
single form of action. When the less jumbled "joinder" view, which
recognizes identities within the union, is taken, seldom is there either
13. Susquehanna S. S. Co. v. Andersen & Co., 239 N. Y. 285, 146 N. E. 381 (1925).
14. City of Syracuse v. Hogan, 234 N. Y. 457, 138 N. E. 4o6 (1923).
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an infringement of jury trial or a failure to keep it within proper
bounds.
Anyone familiar with procedural history knows that the single
form of action involves a freer union of remedies, and of interplay
between them, than was permitted at common law. Unquestionably
barriers have disappeared under it. The problem is to determine how
many have so disappeared, whether they disappear for all or limited
purposes, and whether the concept is a fixed one of concrete character,
or whether it is flexible enough to permit of different developments.
The extent to which the concept colors subordinate provisions in its
development is the specific problem with which this paper is concerned,
but we must know something of the concept first.
The theory that common law actions and equity suits "merge"
under the single form of action has its origin in the form of statement
used in the New York code, and in those codes which have followed the
New York pattern. A composite of that statement is: 15
"There is only one form of civil action. The distinction
between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of those
actions and suits, have been abolished."
Referring to this statement, the leading proponent of the "merger"
theory says: 16 "It should be noticed that the distinction between the
actions themselves and also between their forms is to be abolished.
Distinctions of form and of substance are to be done away with."
Referring in another place to the section on joinder of causes of action,
be calls attention to the language "whether formerly denominated legal
or equitable or both", and insists that those designations are no longer
appropriate because inconsistent with the abolishment of distinctions
17
in the new order.
A literal interpretation of the limited language quoted seems to
lead to the. conclusion for which he argues, but it ignores several things.
It ignores a gradual breakdown of barriers between the common law
forms of action through the overlapping process, and the growing trend
toward fewer and more inclusive remedies without loss of distinct units
within them.' It sees the single form of action as a revolution against
15. CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 46.

16. Ibid.
17. See Clark, The Code Cause of Action (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 817, 825. See the
writer's criticism of the contention in Actions and Causes of Action (1925) 34 YALE
L. I. 6r4, 624.
I8. For example, general assumpsit came to include situations which could be redressed in account, debt on simple contracts, trespass for carrying away goods, and
trover. If plaintiff were content to take their value instead of goods it also embraced
the remedies of detinue and replevin. To understand when the fictitious promise would
be raised, however, it was necessary to understand the essential features of the other
actions.
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what has gone before instead of the final step in an evolutionary process.
It ignores an explanatory note of the inventors of the term "one form
of action" which places definite limitations upon it. They say: "It is,
however, no part of our purpose to present the principle of an union of
law and equity jurisdiction, upon a broader basis than that which has
reference to their forms of proceeding. It is enough for us to knowthat the fundamental law has united these functions in one tribunal;
and in recommending to the legislature a system of practice, by which
those functions may be conveniently exercised, it is only necessary that
we should take care not to encroach upon substantial rights."1 9 It
20
ignores the fact that in the section on joinder of causes of action
the classifications parallel very closely the common law classifications,
liberalizing features coming in only through later amendments, and that
such important remedies as replevin, ejectment and injunctions were
omitted from the general scheme, being specially dealt with..
The New York code commissioners, recognizing the problem of
jury trial under the united procedure, disposed of it by suggesting that
a jury trial could be given in any type of case where any party wanted
it, since the issues in an equity case were no more complicated than in a
law case.2 1 Although this suggested extension of jury trial to all cases
where it was desired, whether legal or equitable, was subsequently made
a constitutional right in North Carolina 2 2 and Texas, 2 3 it never met
with favor in New York and other jurisdictions having the one form
of action, and the framers of the Federal Rules would probably disclaim
any intent to introduce it within the Rules. Unless driven to it through
not knowing how else safely to proceed under Rules io and 38, it is
hardly likely that the federal judiciary will take kindly to the idea.
Although he disclaims the universality of jury trial under the federal single form of action, one of its leading interpreters suggests a
procedure for dealing with doubtful cases which approximates it.2 4
The case supposed is one where plaintiff alleges facts entitling him to
an accounting, but eventually proves only those allegations in the complaint which entitle him to money damages. He says: "Impanel a
jury.* If at the end of the case it is obvious'that there was a partnership agreement (as alleged), the jury can be dismissed and the court
proceed to make its findings of fact and conclusions of law. If the
i. N. Y. COMMISSIONERS ON PRAcTICE AN) PLEADINGS, FIRST REPORT (1848) 74.
See also their statement wherein they recommend doing away with only such forms as
serve to valuable purpose. Id. at 87.
2o. N. Y. Laws 1848, p. 525.
21. N. Y. Comi ssIoxERs, op. cit. supra note ig, at I79.
22. N. C. CoNsT. art. I, § ig, interpreted as applicable to equity cases in Cozad v.
Johnson, 171 N. C. 637, 642, 89 S. E. 37, 39 (1916).
21. TEx. CoNsT. art. V, §§ 8, io.
24. 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 3017-3018.
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case is not obvious, the court should take the jury's verdict on the reasonable value of plaintiff's services; and, in addition, make findings of
fact as to the amount plaintiff is entitled to on a partnership basis.
Then, no matter how it enters judgment for the plaintiff, whether on
the basis of a partnership or on the basis of the jury's verdict, the case
is in such condition that if either party is dissatisfied with the judgment
that is entered and appeals, the appellate court will be able to affirm or,
in most cases, to order judgment entered either on the court's findings
or the jury's verdict, and not be obliged to send the case back for a
new trial." Jury trial would be waived unless demanded. The difficulty with the suggestion lies in the necessity of having a jury hear the
evidence simply because one of the parties demands it, although to all
appearances the case is purely equitable. To require the empanelling of
a jury upon the conjecture that the case may turn out to be one for it
to pass upon, even though at the end of the trial a verdict be not taken,
requires substantially the same expenditures for juries, and the adoption of the practice pertinent to jury trials, as though the verdicts were
taken. Taking verdicts and making findings both may result in a final
determination upon appeal, but the records for such appeals are quite
likely to be voluminous. The suggestion assumes that cases to the jury
and to the judge are, or should be, tried in the same way. Most of the
objections urged against jury trials are based upon the opposite assumption. Juries do greatly complicate procedure because of the necessities
of providing safeguards against improper action by untrained minds.
All trials should not be so complicated because, perchance, the case may
turn out to be one for a jury. Yet the suggestion made is quite consistent with the "merger" theory of the single form of action, although
it is in the direction of effecting the merger by submerging equitable
into legal issues.
The fallacy that, because the determination of whether a jury trial
is to be had in a case comes after the pleadings are drawn, there is no
propriety in an attempt to draw the pleadings with reference thereto,
is responsible for the urge to draw pleadings as the layman tells his
story, making such divisions therein as are called for by good rhetoric.
It is assumed that such letters to the court and opponent are good business letters. But the assumption ignores the peculiar business of courts
to give relief in accordance with law and the facts pertinent thereto.
Grouping together facts which lead to particular reliefs may seem artificial to the layman, but it looks like good sense to the lawyer and judge.
An indiscriminate admixture of facts in a pleading makes it extremely
difficult later to marshal the facts appropriate to reliefs for the purpose
of determining whether the issues are properly triable by jury. A pre-
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trial procedure which calls counsel for the parties before the court for
an informal conference to determine the issues to be tried by a jury
might take the place of formal pleadings if members of the bar were
all co-operative, but the pre-trial procedure of the Federal Rules 25 does
not contemplate fixing the mode of trial. The demand for a jury must
be made before it is had, and a waiver of jury by failure to demand it
cannot as of right be recalled at the later conference. There must be
something upon which to base jury demands; and upon what else if not
upon the pleadings? The lay story type of pleading fits into a system
of procedure to which the jury is foreign, and where all the emphasis
is placed upon the trial at large.26 It does not encourage demurrers,
motions which may delay the trial, or jury demands, and it is difficult
to establish any harmony of relations between them. They belong to
different systems, and neither works well out of its proper environment.
The advocates of the "merger" theory of the single form of action,
as we have seen, derive their doctrine from the abolishing language in
the New York code, giving it a literal interpretation. But in many of
25. FED. RULES CIV. PROC. (1934) rule 16. For comment on this rule see I MooRE,
FEDERAL PRAcricE (1938) 439, 814-827. In the first of these references the author
observes that the pleading rules are implemented by and depend upon pre-trial procedure for the formulation of issues, and to disclose the true nature of the action, making pleadings, in and of themselves, relatively unimportant. But aside from the fact
that the contemplated pre-trial procedure in order follows the jury demand, instead of
preceding it, whether it is had at all depends on judicial discretion.
The suggestion that supplementing devices make pleadings relatively unimportant
is one worth pondering over. If vague, colorless and uninformative pleadings are in
fact employed, something else usually has to do their work. Common counts produce
bills of particulars. Disguising multiple counts and general issues bring discovery into
law actions. Attempts at notice pleading bring all these, and pre-trial procedure in addition. Pleadings may be simplified to the point of unimportance, but usually the simplification at this point brings compensating complications at another, one of them being
to find the compass which points to the proper mode of trial when pleading clouds
obscure the polar star.
26. The so-called Notice Pleading, much advocated but nowhere used in courts of
record in this country, is based upon the theory that defendants usually know all about
claims against them, and that about the only function of pleadings is to identify time
and place. Legal theory is squeezed out. Demurrers never have accomplished anything but delays. Cases ought not be tried twice, once on the pleadings and again on
the merits. It is folly to attempt to formulate issues in advance of trial. All intervening obstacles to a quick trial on the merits should be eliminated. See CLARK, CODE
PLEADING

(1928)

29;

Arnold, Simonton and Havighurst, JudicialAdministration (1929)

36 W. VA. L. Q. 26, 32-33; McCaskill, The Ehsive Cause of Action (1937) 4 U. OF CmI.
L. REV. 281, 284-285; Whittier, Notice Pleading (1918) 31 HARv. L. REV. 501. It is
said that many municipal courts follow this system, and that its best illustration is the
motion for judgment procedure of the Virginias. In none of these courts, however, has
there been a total elimination of the demurrer, motion to make definite, and other proceedings intervening between the pleadings and the trial. Technicalities have been
eliminated, and improvements made, but even here a disclosure of legal theory relied
upon can be forced in advance of trial, and a trial had on the pleadings. The pleadings
of the modern English courts, often referred to, are not as simple as often represented,
for "the pleadings" in present English trials include not only what we think of as
pleadings, but all the information extracted by depositions, discovery, and other new
supplementing devices. The advocates of the "merger" theory of the one form of
action are enthusiasts for the pure type of Notice Pleading, but that the federal rules
adopt no such concept is evidenced by the motions which function as demurrers, FED.
RuLrs Cirv. PRoc. (1934) rules 7, m2; motions for summary judgment, id., rule 56;
and provisions for discovery, id., rules 36, 37.
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the states which adopted the one form of action all reference to abolition
of distinctions was deleted.27 It was too uncertain what these words
accomplished, and it may have been thought more wise to let the provisions of the codes work out some sort of uniform procedure unhindered
than to attempt to impress dubious overtones upon them. But the
merger advocates are not content to confine their doctrines to the New
York type of one form of action. They insist upon the abolishing of
distinctions whether it is expressly mentioned or not.28 There is,
and can be, but one type of single form of action, and that is the
merger type. The merger idea, therefore, cannot be divorced from the
one form of action. It must pervade and influence the interpretation
of every part of the system. It must, of necessity, affect pleading provisions, by implication if not expressly.
Having shown the relation between the one form of action, pleadings and jury demands, we should now ascertain whether the merger
advocates, some of whom were members of the advisory committee
which drafted the Federal Rules, 29 succeeded in writing their overtones
into the new system.
No evidence of it is found in Rule 2. There is no mention of
abolishing distinctions. The first part of Rule 38 is a model of virtue,
not excelled by the tables from Sinai. But idolaters will strive for a
golden calf, and take up church subscriptions to get it. An easy going
Aaron may be beguiled with Rule IO,but a Moses may also appear on
the scene. In that Rule the attempt is made to institute the story telling
type of pleading, with its intermingling of facts without reference to
appropriate remedy or legal significance, and which forms issues of
such indefinite character that jury demands cannot be aimed at them
successfully. It is the more dangerous because it is a flank movement
instead of a frontal attack. The pertinent portion of the Rule reads:
"Each claim founded upon a separate transaction or occurrence . . . shall be stated in a separate count

.

.

. whenever

a separation facilitates the clear presentation of the matters set
forth." 80

Observe a plausible interpretation, and one which will be urged.
"Claims founded upon the same transaction or occurrence may be set
out together in one narrative always. They may also be set out together
27. HEPBURN, THE HIsTORIcAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING (1897) C. 5.
I MOORF, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 142-145; cf. CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928)

28.
47-50.

29. Judge Charles E. Clark, formerly Dean of the Yale Law School, was Reporter
for the Advisory Committee. Prof. James Win. Moore was a research assistant to the
committee.
30. The rule is set forth in full in note 5 supra.
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even when they arise out of separate transactions and occurrences unless
it interferes with clear story telling." The transaction or occurrence is
made the procedural unit for pleading. As transaction and occurrence
have never been given boundaries in law of definite character, it is
natural to attach only lay boundaries to them. If these are the
boundaries authorized, then the transaction is what is to be pleaded.
Though the claim may be present, it may be commingled, or scrambled,
with other claims. The cause of action is to be forgotten, for it has
too many complicating legal implications. 3 1 Try to apply the jury
demand of Rule 38 to such a pleading if the transaction involves facts
giving both legal and equitable relief, or alternative legal and equitable
relief ! If it appears easy in the case selected, take one where, under the
divided procedure, a plaintiff was privilegd to proceed partly at law and
partly in equity (as where he first settled title at law, and then sought
equitable relief in equity), or wholly in equity. The recognized mergers
in equity were the result of the inability of equity courts to exercise law
jurisdiction. A dual forum may exercise dual jurisdiction, and joinders
do not necessitate mergers into a single character. 32 The benefits of the
old mergers should be retained without forcing new ones. The old
mergers were within the Constitution. Plaintiffs could accept them for
themselves, and force them on defendants. Any new type of merger
forced upon the parties under the dual system would appear not to be
valid, unless joinder of legal and equitable remedies is expressly made
a waiver of jury trial, which it is not. The failure to demand it is the
only waiver provided for in the rules.
We have seen how Justice Cardozo became perplexed because of
the supposed merger effect of the New York single form of action, rendering opinions difficult to reconcile, and that somewhere along the line
jury trial was either curtailed or given an undesirably extended scope.
In two of those cases 33 the complaints differed in no respect from equity
bills. Under the old procedure, and new, there was a proper merger of
all issues on the complaint into equitable issues, unless the old merger
is lost. The privilege to sever under the enlarged jurisdiction was not
availed of and was waived. There was no reason why this privilege
should require two actions. Separate statements in the complaint could
have effected it, with trial of the title issues first. When defendant
brought in counterclaims,3 4 which of necessity were separately stated
31. i MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTiCE (1938)
(1928) 83-84.

3, 145-147; cf.

CLARK, CODE PLEADING

32. This subject has been developed by the writer in Actions and Causes of Action
34 YALE L. J. 614, 630.
33. Di Menna v. Cooper & Evans Co., 22o N. Y. 391, 115 N. E. 993 (1917) ; Syracuse v. Hogan, 234 N. Y. 457, 138 N. E. 4o6 (1923).
34. As in Di Menna v. Cooper & Evans Co., 220 N. Y. 391, 394, 115 N. E. 993
(1917), and Susquehanna Steamship Co. v. Andersen & Co., 239 N. Y. 285, 290, 146
N. E. 381, 386 (1925).
(1925)
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from the complaint, if the issues on them were of different character
from those in the complaint, there was no occasion to apply the merger
principle. There was a joinder merely, and each of the different kinds
of issues might have received their appropriate mode of trial. To the
extent that they overlapped, an adjudication under one method should
have obviated the necessity of determining them under the other. The
issues were not legal as to one of the parties and equitable as to the
other, because of a jury demand by one and a waiver by the other.
Such a concept is most confusing. The issues, as to both, were the
same in character, but, as to both, the same issues were made under the
complaint and under the counterclaim. Had two suits been pending at
the same time, one on the complaint and another on the counterclaim
this would be perfectly clear. The chancellor, by deciding the issues
first, could enjoin the further hearing at law. The prior adjudication
at law, barring special circumtsances, would bind the chancellor. The
chancellor is no less a chancellor because he also acts as a law judge
in the same trial. But instead of his legal characteristics racing with
his equitable characteristics for priority, they unite in agreeing which
shall prevail in a particular case. In effect, though not in words, this
is what Justice Cardozo worked out in the first case discussed. 35 The
verdicts of the jury prevailed. He could have held without error that
the trial judge might have treated the verdicts as advisory, and have
discarded them.
In the second case 36 with which he dealt the counterclaim to
reform the contract was equitable. The issues of mutual mistake of
fact and fraud in inducement necessitated ignoring the parol evidence
rule, and were not proper issues for a jury in a well ordered trial. This
was frankly admitted. But apparently under the temporary influence
of the merger theory of the single form of action, he held that the
issues under the counterclaim took the character of the issues in the
complaint to which they were attached. Here there was no overlapping
of issues as in the previous case. The mutual mistake and fraud issues
involved the counterclaim only. They were not defensive to the complaint, though they were also improperly embodied in the answer.
Answers and counterclaims have distinctive functions which should not
be scrambled together by any merger theory, mixing up issues which
properly belong to the jury with those which do not.
In the third case 37 the issues were all such as might have been
found in a properly constituted equity suit for mandatory injunction.
They might have been found in distinct suits, one of which was eject35; Di Menna v. Cooper & Evans Co., 2o N. Y. 391, 115 N. E. 993 (i917).
36. Susquehanna S. S. Co. v. Andersen & Co., 239 N. Y. 285, 146 N. E. 381 (1925).
37. City of Syracuse v. Hogan, 234 N. Y. 457, 138 N. E. 406 (1923).

JURY DEMANDS-NEW FEDERAL PROCEDURE

ment alone, but that was not their environment in this case. There
might have been an attempt in the single suit to have characterized the
issues bearing on title and right to possession alone, as by segregating
them in a separate count, and thus indicate that a proper equitable
merger was not desired. No such attempt was made. The form of
the pleading indicated a desired merger. Plaintiff alone determined
whether there should or should not be a merger under the old procedure,
and when constitutions were adopted, the granting of a jury to defendant was a favor, not a right. The majority of the court, getting tangled
up on its merger theories, merged the equitable into the legal issues,
extending the functions of a jury, just what Justice Cardozo sanctioned
in the case previously discussed, but to which he could not agree in the
present case. The difficulties in the three cases consisted of inconsistent uses of the merger principle, and a failure to distinguish between
joinders and mergers.
Federal Rule io does or does not invite the pleader and the court
into malignant "mergeritis", depending upon the interpretation adopted.
If emphasis is placed upon the transaction, giving it a lay scope, partitioning pleadings into counts according to rhetoric instead of according to reliefs obtainable in law, improper mergers will almost certainly
follow. Distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity are so
thoroughly abolished that in many cases it will be impossible to determine the proper scope of jury trial, and jury demands under Rule 38
will be arrows shot in the dark. The wishes of the parties, or the
guesses of the trial judges, rather than the Constitution, will determine
what is obtained. The parties may get too little, or too much. If, in
interpreting Rule io, the emphasis is placed on pleading the claim,
rather than the lay transaction (not requiring separate actions for separate claims, but separate divisions within the single action), the target
for jury demands will be a distinct one. A transaction is an elastic
concept which may be moulded to fit efficient judicial administration.
For judicial purposes, it may be confined to the facts out of which a
single claim arise. It may contain some facts of no legal import, and
hence be larger than the claim, and be something out of which the claim
may arise without being identical with it, but when additional facts
appear having legal import upon another claim a second transaction
appears. A separation into counts will "facilitate the clear presentation
of the matters set forth" whenever a more distinct target for jury
demands is thus presented.
The writer has been unable to discover that any of the federal
courts have thus far have fallen victims of "mergeritis", the communism of legal and equitable remedies and insidious destroyer of con-
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stitutional jury rights. Propaganda, however, is to be found everywhere-in bar meetings to discuss the Rules, in current texts upon them,
and in articles in law reviews. Members of law faculties have contracted the disease, and are passing it on to students. We should not
blind ourselves to the seriousness of the evil because it has not as yet
produced a major casualty in the new system. Its judicial victims are
many in other jurisdictions having the one form of action.

